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Abstract 
 
Aversive emotions are likely to be a key source of irrational human decision-making 
but still little is known about the underlying neural circuitry. Here, we show that 
aversive emotions distort trust decisions and cause significant changes in the 
associated neural circuitry. They reduce trust and suppress trust-specific activity in 
left temporoparietal junction (TPJ). In addition, aversive emotions reduce the 
functional connectivity between TPJ and emotion-related regions such as the 
amygdala. We also find that the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) plays a key 
role in mediating the impact of aversive emotions on brain-behavior relationships. 
Functional connectivity of right pSTS with left TPJ not only predicts mean trust 
taking in the absence of negative emotions, but aversive emotions also largely remove 
this association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and behavioral trust. These findings 
may be useful for a better understanding of the neural circuitry of affective distortions 
and may thus help identify the neural bases of psychiatric diseases that are associated 
with emotion-related psychological and behavioral dysfunctions.  
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Trust pervades almost every aspect of human social life. It plays a decisive role in 
families, organizations, markets and in the political sphere. Without trust, families fall 
apart, organizations are inefficient, market transactions are costly and political leaders 
lack public support. Recent research in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics 
has begun to elucidate the determinants and neural correlates of trust 1-3. However, 
despite recent progress in understanding the determinants of trust 4 and its distortions 
in psychiatric disorders 5,6, there are still large gaps in our knowledge about the 
impact of our emotions on trust taking 7,8, and the underlying neural circuitry. 
Emotions, in particular those with high intensity, can have deleterious effects on our 
decision-making faculties, as hinted at by a multitude of public press reports and 
recent theoretical 9 and experimental accounts 10-13. It is therefore important to 
understand the behavioral and neural mechanisms by which emotions distort 
decisions to trust. 
 
While much progress has been made in outlining the neural underpinnings of 
emotional processes on the one hand 14,15 and of decision-making on the other 16,17, 
the effects of emotion on choice have received – with some exceptions 10-12 – less 
attention to date. Theoretical accounts of the influence of emotion on choice 9 
distinguish between two types of emotions: anticipatory emotions, such as the 
anticipated pleasure from the future consumption of a good that reflect how decision-
makers expect to feel about the outcomes of their decisions, and incidental emotions 
that occur at the time of the decision, but are unrelated to the choice outcomes. 
Incidental emotions are of particular interest because of their ubiquity in real life and 
because they are prime candidates for emotion-induced behavioral distortions. By 
definition, incidental emotions are unrelated to choice outcomes and, to the extent to 
which they affect behavior, may cause irrational behavioral biases.  
 
To study the behavioral impact and the underlying neural circuitry of emotion-
induced distortions of trust, we adapted the trust game 18 to an imaging context. In the 
trust game, two anonymous players, which we call investor and trustee, sequentially 
send money to each other. In the first stage, the investor faces the choice of whether 
and how much of her endowment to transfer to the trustee. Then the experimenter 
triples the sent amount, before it is transferred to the trustee. The investor’s decision 
to transfer money thus increases the total amount of money that can be distributed 
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among the two players. In the second stage, the trustee is informed about the total 
amount that he received after which he can send back part or all of this money. Thus, 
while the investor’s transfer increases the total amount of money available to both 
parties, the investor also faces the risk of benefitting nothing from the transfer 
because the trustee is completely free in his back-transfer decision. Therefore, the 
decision to transfer money constitutes an act of trust, as the investor makes herself 
vulnerable to the potentially selfish behavior of the trustee 4. 
 
Such trust taking involves both a financial risk due to the possibility of losing the 
invested money, as well as a social risk of being betrayed by an untrustworthy trustee.  
Therefore, to enable clear identification of the impact of incidental emotion on the 
mechanisms involved in the social aspects of trust taking, it is important to include a 
well-matched non-social control task. For this reason, our subjects also faced a non-
social control condition that was identical to the trust condition in every respect 
except that instead of a trustee, a computer made a “back-transfer” that determined 
the profitability of the investor’s “transfer” 19,20.  The profitability of the investor’s 
transfer in the non-social control and trust condition was exactly the same because the 
investors had exactly the same choice options in both conditions and the computer 
sampled the “back-transfer” decisions in the non-social control condition according to 
the probability distribution of back-transfers that was generated by the trustees’ 
decisions in the trust condition (see online Methods). Therefore, the distinguishing 
feature between the trust and the non-social control game was the unique possibility 
of betrayal by the interaction partner in the trust game, which was not present in the 
non-social control game 2. This difference between the trust and the non-social control 
game was saliently indicated at the beginning of each respective trial with either a 
human-like symbol on the computer screen (in the trust game) or a non-human 
symbol (in the non-social control game).  
 
Subjects made decisions in either trust or non-social control trials within two different 
emotional contexts. They were either under the threat of relatively intense tactile 
stimulation that was somewhat painful (“threat condition”), or they faced the 
possibility of receiving weak tactile stimulation in the “no threat” condition (Figure 
1a). A prolonged period of incidental aversive emotion was established by 
administering the tactile stimulations at unpredictable time points and frequencies for 
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the duration of an entire block. A block consisted of several trust or control trials in 
the threat condition or several such trials in the no-threat condition. The threat-of-
shock paradigm employed in the current study has been shown to reliably induce 
negative emotion 21-23 and addresses the limitations of standard emotion induction 
procedures 24,25 as follows: (1) threat of shock provides an immediate stimulus of 
biological significance that triggers an aversive and automatic emotional reaction, the 
intensity of which can be measured throughout the experiment using standard 
psychophysiological techniques; (2) using a blocked threat-of-shock paradigm 
reinstates the emotional reaction at every presentation, which can thus be maintained 
for the duration of the entire experiment; (3) threat of shock was administered within-
subject, therefore allowing each subject to serve as their own control; (4) tactile 
stimulation was administered in both the trust and the non-social control condition, 
thus minimizing demand effects. 
 
In our set-up, decisions to trust entail the unique possibility of being betrayed by the 
trustee and therefore provide a strong incentive to avoid such betrayal 2. Therefore, 
the investor needs to take this aversive outcome into consideration when deciding 
how much money to entrust the interaction partner, which is accomplished by taking 
the perspective of the trustee and assess how she will react to given transfers. To 
identify these trust-specific computations, the non-social control task is identical to 
the trust game, except that in the latter the investor has to use his social-cognitive 
abilities to assess how much the trustee – a human being – will send back. This 
assessment requires mentalizing and perspective taking, in contrast to the non-social 
control task for which no such processes are necessary to make a decision. Decisions 
to trust therefore should involve neural processes linked to mentalizing, a hypothesis 
that is backed up by theoretical accounts 26 and numerous reports that brain areas 
commonly found to be involved in mentalizing (including DMPFC, STS, TPJ) are 
activated during the trust game (e.g., 6,27-30). We conjectured that incidental aversive 
emotion modulates these trust-specific computations, particularly the simulations of 
the trustee’s reaction to given transfers. This has potentially important implications 
because if incidental aversive emotion disrupts the recruitment of the social-cognitive 
processes necessary for mentalizing and perspective taking, we are likely to observe 
that aversive emotion also has specific effects on the neural mechanisms of trust 
decisions. In other words, even if aversive emotion would have comparable 
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behavioral effects in the trust game and the non-social control task, we may be able to 
identify trust-specific effects of aversive emotion on neurocognitive processing 
because mentalizing and perspective taking are uniquely required in the trust game 
but not in the non-social control task.   
 
Neurally, we therefore expected that incidental aversive emotion influences trust 
decisions by specifically modulating neural responses in regions involved in 
representing other people’s mental states, including temporoparietal junction (TPJ) 
and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) 31-33. These regions have been 
consistently implicated in trust decisions 27,29,30,34,35. Moreover, they may be affected 
by incidental aversive emotion because a conjunction of the neurosynth meta-analyses 
for the terms “emotion” and “theory of mind” identifies an overlap between these 
networks in TPJ and DMPFC. Together, the above results establish these regions as 
prime candidates for investigations of the modulatory effects of incidental aversive 
emotion on mentalizing during trust decisions. In addition, we also expected an effect 
of the threatening context on areas known to be involved in the processing 14 and 
regulation of emotions 36, particularly during behavior that requires goal-directed 
cognition, such as decision-making 37. A region that meets these criteria is the 
amygdala, which has consistently 38 and relatively specifically (neurosynth reverse 
inference analysis for “aversive”) been implicated in processing aversive emotion, but 
also plays a central role in trustworthiness inferences 39,40. Specifically, we 
hypothesized that this region is involved in trustworthiness assessments associated 
with mentalizing during trust decisions in the absence of threat, while in the presence 
of threat, the amygdala will be preoccupied with evaluating and monitoring the 
emotionally salient threatening context. We therefore investigated the functional 
connectivity between regions involved in assessing the trustworthiness of interaction 
partners during decision-making (TPJ, DMPFC) and regions involved in signaling 
emotional salience and aversive emotions such as the amygdala. 
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Results 
 
Threat of shock induces autonomic arousal and aversive emotions 
during decision-making 
We scanned 41 volunteers while they made trust decisions during the emotionally 
aversive threat condition and during the emotionally neutral no-threat condition. In a 
series of manipulation checks, we first assessed whether threat of shock induced 
emotional arousal by probing galvanic skin conductance responses (SCR), self-
reported emotion and brain activations in response to electrical stimulation. As 
illustrated in Figures 1b and 1c, mean SCR during both trust and non-social control 
trials were significantly greater during the threat condition compared to the no-threat 
condition [significant two-way interaction between the factors threat and time: 
F(16,624) = 99.28, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.718]. Follow-up pairwise comparisons at each 
time point show significantly enhanced SCR during threat relative to no threat from 2 
until 16 seconds after trial onset during trust, and from 3 until 16 seconds after trial 
onset during non-social control decisions (all two-tailed tests survive Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons with all t(39) > 3.313 and all p < 0.002). Taken 
together, these results indicate significantly greater emotional arousal during the 
threat condition relative to the no-threat condition in both social and non-social game 
types. 
 
-------------------------------------[insert Figure 1]---------------------------------------------- 
 
The emotional arousal illustrated in Figures 1b and 1c was clearly experienced as 
aversive by the subjects. In an open-ended questionnaire administered after scanning, 
95.12% of subjects responded that they experienced aversive emotional arousal 
during threat blocks (Supplementary Figure 1a). The aversive nature of the threat 
condition was further confirmed by strong activations of central nodes of the brain’s 
pain matrix during the (actual) experience of strong compared to weak tactile shocks 
(Supplementary Figure 1c) and by the observation of enhanced SCRs following the 
(actual) experience of strong compared to weak tactile shocks (Supplementary Figure 
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1b). 
Jointly, the above electrophysiological results, self-reported emotions and activation 
within the brain’s pain matrix during and after the shock, indicate that subjects 
experienced the threat of a shock as an aversive and arousing emotional state. This 
state is clearly unrelated to the monetary outcome of trust- and risk-taking, as it does 
not affect the trustee’s or the computer’s decisions. The next question we addressed is 
whether this incidental emotional state distorts subjects’ behavior relative to the no-
threat control condition. 
Aversive emotion reduces investments during trust decisions 
To identify whether the aversive emotional state had a significant impact on decision-
making, we first investigated mean transfer rates during trust and non-social control 
decisions for each emotional context and submitted these data to a two-way repeated-
measures ANOVA (Mean transfer rates were normally distributed as indicated by the 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test: W = 0.976, p = 0.510) with the factors game type (trust, 
control) and threat (absent, present). Aversive emotional state significantly changed 
transfers during both trust and non-social control trials (Figure 1d), as indicated by 
significant main effects of threat [F(1,40) = 17.483, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.304]. Moreover, 
separate pairwise comparisons (all two-tailed) showed that the threat condition led to 
a reduction of investments (Figure 1d) in the trust game [t(40) = -3.4, p < 0.005, mean 
transfer difference = -1.1 CHF] and in the non-social control game [t(40) = -3.16, p < 
0.005, mean transfer difference = -0.93 CHF]. To exclude the possibility that choices 
were affected by the actual experience of shocks, rather than by the ongoing aversive 
emotion due to shock expectation, we ran several multiple regression analyses 
(Supplementary Text 1). The regression results (Supplementary Table 1) show that 
the behavioral results reported above were indeed due to the aversive emotion (p < 
0.001) generated by the threat of shock, rather than reflecting the effect of actual 
shock experience immediately before decisions are taken (p = 0.23). 
Aversive emotion also led to faster reaction times during both trust- and non-social 
control trials (Figure 1e). Mean reaction times were submitted to a two-way repeated-
measures ANOVA (Mean reaction times were normally distributed as indicated by 
the Shapiro-Wilk normality test: W = 0.972, p = 0.402) with the factors game type 
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(trust, control) and threat (absent, present). We obtained a significant main effect of 
threat [F(1,40) = 17.01, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.298]. The main effect of threat is 
characterized by significantly (two-tailed) faster mean reaction times in the threat 
relative to the no-threat condition (Figure 1e) for both the trust game [t(40) = -3.3, p < 
0.005, mean RT difference = -0.13 s] and the non-social control task [t(40) = -2.5, p < 
0.05, mean RT difference = -0.13 s].  
Taken together, these behavioral results indicate that aversive emotion significantly 
reduced trust taking, as reflected by diminished transfer rates in the trust game. 
Additionally, aversive emotion reduced transfer rates in the nonsocial control task and 
reaction times in both the trust and the nonsocial control task. Notably, the absence of 
a significant interaction between threat and game type for electrophysiological and 
behavioral measures (transfer rates: F(1,40) = 0.122, p = 0.7, η2 = 0.003, response 
latencies: F(1,40) < 0.001, p = 0.993, η2 < 0.001, SCR: F(1,39) = 0.006, p = 0.938, η2 
< 0.001) indicates that the impact of aversive emotion during trust and nonsocial 
control trials is similar across these multiple measurement modalities, confirming that 
our non-social condition constitutes a well-matched control for the trust game. 
 
Aversive emotion suppresses trust-related activity in TPJ 
The main goal of our fMRI analyses was to identify the neural circuitry underlying 
emotion-induced distortions of trust decisions. We therefore first examined brain 
activation in the ROIs that we conjectured (see our hypotheses in the introductory 
section) to be preferentially engaged during trust-specific computations, such as the 
assessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness and the associated interplay between social 
cognition and social valuation. Regions involved in representing other people’s 
mental states include temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex (DMPFC41). We employed small-volume correction at an FWE-corrected 
threshold of p < 0.05 in truly independent ROIs defined with reverse inference maps 
from relevant search terms on neurosynth.org 42 (see online Methods). In the final part 
of this paper we will also examine the domain general effects (i.e. the effects that are 
not specific to the trust game) of aversive emotions.  
As a first step, our analyses confirmed that several of the conjectured regions were 
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indeed specifically involved in trust (vs. non-social control) decisions when aversive 
emotion was absent (Trustno threat > NS Controlno threat). That is, areas in left TPJ (-57, -
60, 27; k = 247; green region in Figure 2a) and DMPFC (-9, 60, 18; k = 39; green 
region in PFC in Figure 2a) showed significantly greater activation during decision-
making in trust relative to control trials in the absence of threat (all activations SV 
FWE-corrected, see also Supplementary Table 2a). Moreover, we additionally find a 
large cluster in left TPJ that survives whole-brain correction and extends into Superior 
Temporal Gyrus (-57, -60, 31, k = 701) and, at a relaxed threshold a cluster in right 
TPJ (p < 0.005, uncorrected; 52, -49, 27, k = 161). We then examined which of the 
ROIs showed a breakdown of trust-specific activity due to aversive emotion. To 
identify the threat-induced reduction in brain activation that is specific to the trust 
game we need to know in which ROI’s the contrast (Trustno threat > Trustthreat) is 
significantly larger than the contrast (NS Controlno threat > NS Controlthreat). In other 
words, a positive activation contrast (Trustno threat > Trustthreat) is not sufficient for a 
trust-specific effect because it could also be the case that in the non-social control 
condition the threat of shock induces a reduction in brain activation. Therefore, we 
examined the breakdown of trust-specific activity due to aversive emotion by 
computing the following interaction contrast: (Trustno threat > Trustthreat) > (NS 
Controlno threat > NS Controlthreat). Note that this interaction contrast is orthogonal to 
the above mentioned simple contrast (Trustno threat > NS Controlno threat) because the 
sum of the products of the corresponding coefficients for the simple effects and 
interaction contrasts adds to zero.  
 
A region in left TPJ indeed showed a significant interaction effect (-60, -54, 19; k = 
95, SV FWE-corrected, yellow region in Figure 2a, see also Supplementary Table 
2b). Note, however, that our findings of trust-specific suppression in left TPJ also 
extend to right TPJ at a relaxed threshold (p < 0.005, uncorrected; 51, -48, 31, k = 
88). To further characterize this interaction effect we examined post hoc the impact of 
aversive affect in the trust game separately from its impact in the non-social control 
game: the results of the contrast (Trustno threat > Trustthreat) during trust trials shows a 
suppression of activation for trust decisions within left TPJ (-58, -55, 19; k = 103; SV 
FWE-corrected, Supplementary Table 2c). During non-social control decisions on the 
other hand, no voxels in our left TPJ ROI showed greater activity during no threat 
relative to threat (NSCNo Threat > NSCThreat), even at a very liberal threshold of p < 0.05, 
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uncorrected (see also Supplementary Figure 2a for additional univariate analyses that 
underline the strength of the interaction effect in left TPJ). These results indicate that 
the interaction effect is based on a selective interference of aversive emotion with 
trust-related activity, but not with activity in the nonsocial control condition. 
 
-----------------------------------------[insert Figure 2]------------------------------------------ 
 
Given that decisions involving trust rely on neural circuitry that mediates the interplay 
between social cognition and valuation 1, we also performed an exploratory analysis 
of the impact of aversive emotion on trust-related activity within regions commonly 
implicated in valuation (vmPFC and ventral striatum 43). These results show 
reductions in trust-related activity due to aversive emotion in vmPFC and ventral 
striatum (Supplementary Table 2c). For completeness, we also conducted a whole 
brain analysis to identify potentially important activations outside our a-priori regions 
of interest. The whole brain analysis shows that in the left superior temporal sulcus, 
posterior cingulate cortex and left inferior parietal lobe (Supplementary Figure 3 and 
Supplementary Table 3) aversive emotion suppresses brain activity only in the trust 
game but not in the nonsocial control game. However, in these regions we do not find 
a significant interaction effect in the sense that suppression of activity due to aversive 
emotion is significantly stronger in the trust relative to the nonsocial control task.  
 
Aversive emotion suppresses trust-specific connectivity between TPJ 
and amygdala 
Recent studies stress the importance of the interplay between cognitive and emotional 
networks 14,37. Therefore, we investigated the effects of aversive emotion on the 
connectivity between trust-relevant brain regions with Psychophysiological 
Interaction analyses (PPI) 44. In view of the key role of the temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ) in perspective taking and mentalizing 32,45 and the conjecture that these mental 
operations are important for trust taking, and our finding of enhanced activity in TPJ 
in the trust compared to the control task (see above), we were particularly interested 
in how aversive emotion changes the functional connectivity between the TPJ and 
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emotion processing regions, such as the amygdala. ROI analysis of the data during the 
threat-absent condition (Trustno threat > NS Controlno threat) confirmed that the 
connectivity between the TPJ and a region in left amygdala (-22, -9, -15; p < 0.05, SV 
FWE-corrected, k = 14) is indeed stronger during decisions in the trust relative to the 
control task (Supplementary Table 4a). Moreover, at a relaxed threshold a cluster in 
right amygdala also shows stronger connectivity with TPJ during trust compared to 
non-social decision-making (p < 0.005, uncorrected; 22, -6, -11, k = 25). Therefore, 
we were interested whether there is a trust-specific threat-induced connectivity 
change. To answer this question we performed an interaction analysis that examined 
whether the threat-induced connectivity change in the trust condition, (Trustno threat > 
Trustthreat), is larger than the threat-induced connectivity change in the control 
condition (NS Controlno threat > NS Controlthreat). Note that this interaction contrast is 
orthogonal to the above mentioned simple contrast (Trustno threat > NS Controlno threat) 
because the sum of the products of the corresponding contrast coefficients adds to 
zero.  
 
This analysis revealed threat-induced aversive emotion causes a stronger connectivity 
change between TPJ and a region in the amygdala [left: -26, 0, -23; p < 0.05, SV 
FWE-corrected, k = 29, Figure 2c shown in yellow; right at relaxed threshold of p < 
0.005, uncorrected: 28, -7, -21, k = 18] in the trust game compared to the control task 
(see Supplementary Table 4b). We performed a post-hoc inspection of the significant 
interaction in left amygdala by investigating the effect of threat on connectivity 
changes for the trust and the non-social control condition separately. We find that 
aversive emotion disrupted functional connectivity specifically during trust (compare 
red vs green bars in Figure 2d) but not during non-social control decisions. A follow-
up contrast investigating threat effects on trust-related connectivity patterns (TrustNo 
threat > TrustThreat) confirmed the suppression of TPJ-amygdala connectivity during 
trust decisions (-28, -6, -14; p < 0.05, SV FWE-corrected, k = 110, Supplementary 
Table 4c). In contrast, during decisions in the non-social control task no voxels in our 
left amygdala ROI showed greater connectivity during no threat relative to threat, or 
the reverse contrast of threat vs. no threat, even at a very liberal threshold of p < 0.05, 
uncorrected (see also Supplementary Figure 2b for additional analyses that underline 
the strength of the interaction effect in left amygdala). Moreover, comparison of 
connectivity during decisions in the control compared to the trust task in the threat 
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condition shows significant suppression of connectivity during trust relative to non-
social decisions in left amygdala (-26, 0, -23, p < 0.05, SV FWE-corrected, k = 14), 
indicating that the threat-related suppression of TPJ-amygdala connectivity is also 
evident when comparing NS control to trust. Together, these results indicate that 
threat causes specific suppression of connectivity during trust taking that can be 
observed when comparing the effect of threat within the trust task (Trust: no threat > 
threat), as well as the effect of threat on connectivity during trust relative to NS 
control decisions (Threat: ns control > trust). This suppression of TPJ-amygdala 
connectivity during trust decisions occurs in the absence of suppression during non-
social control decisions (ns control: threat = no threat). Thus, aversive emotion not 
only affected trust-specific overall activation in the TPJ, but also led to trust-specific 
connectivity changes of this area with the amygdala. 
 
A trust network: TPJ connectivity strength with pSTS, DMPFC and 
VLPFC specifically predicts behavioral trust  
The above PPI analyses show the average impact of aversive emotion on the 
functional connectivity between TPJ and amygdala. However, as we observed strong 
individual differences in the functional connectivity between TPJ and amygdala on 
the one hand, and in mean transfer levels on the other hand, we next asked the 
question how individual differences in functional TPJ connectivity are related to 
individuals’ mean transfer levels in the absence and the presence of aversive emotion. 
Following our analysis approach for TPJ activity and connectivity above, we first 
identify trust-specific brain-behavior correlations by comparing the relationship 
between transfer rates and TPJ functional connectivity as a function of game type in 
the absence of threat (Trustno threat > NS Controlno threat). Specifically, we examined 
whether in our a priori ROIs the relationship between mean transfers and functional 
TPJ connectivity is different in the trust game compared to the non-social control 
game via a flexible factorial model that, in addition to the factors Subject, Task and 
Threat, also includes mean transfer levels in each condition as covariates. We find 
that in the conjectured ROIs the connectivity between the seed region in the left TPJ 
and the right amygdala [27, 2, -20, k = 90], the DMPFC [-8, 40, 20, k = 692] and the 
right STS [64, -43, 4, k = 157; note (see online methods) that the STS is the most 
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ventral part of our TPJ mask] exhibits a significantly stronger positive correlation 
with mean transfer rates in the trust game compared to the non-social control game 
(all p < 0.05, SV FWE-corrected, Supplementary Table 5a). In the next step, we 
conducted an exploratory whole-brain analysis (FWE-corrected at the cluster level) 
that identified an extended network of regions (Figure 3a-b, d) and Supplementary 
Table 6a) that showed a difference in the relationship between individuals’ mean 
transfers and their functional TPJ connectivity across trust and control tasks (in the 
absence of threat). The regions in this network comprised DMPFC [-2, 17, 54, k = 
6216], the right superior temporal sulcus (STS) extending into angular gyrus [right: 
64, -43, 4, k = 1188, left: at a relaxed threshold of p < 0.005, uncorrected, -62, -45, 4, k 
= 22] and other regions such as bilateral ventrolateral PFC (see Supplementary Table 
6a]. In all these regions we observe a positive and significantly stronger correlation 
between mean transfer levels and functional TPJ connectivity in the trust compared to 
the control task (see Figure 3a-b, d and Supplementary Table 6a).  
Finally, we also tested whether the slightly negative slopes observed in the regression 
lines connecting TPJ connectivity and mean transfer rates in the non-social control 
conditions of Figure 3a-b and 3d are statistically significant. To this end, we ran 
simple effects contrasts probing for a correlation between TPJ connectivity strength 
and mean transfer during NS control decisions in the absence of threat. We found no 
evidence that TPJ connectivity with its target regions negatively predicts transfer rates 
in the NS control condition, even at a relaxed threshold of p < 0.05. 
Taken together, the above results therefore confirm the conjecture that there is a trust-
specific functional connectivity between the TPJ and amygdala that is suppressed by 
aversive emotions. In addition, the larger the TPJ connectivity with key regions 
implicated in mentalizing (the DMPFC and right STS) and emotion (the amygdala), 
the more subjects are willing to trust their partners on average. Moreover, this 
predictive relationship between transfer rates and TPJ connectivity is absent in the 
non-social control game. These results thus suggest a trust-specific network based on 
TPJ activity and the connectivity of TPJ with a network consisting of the amygdala, 
right STS, DMPFC and bilateral VLPFC.  
 
--------------------------------------------[insert Figure 3]---------------------------------------- 
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Aversive emotion removes the relationship between TPJ connectivity strength 
and behavioral trust 
How does the relationship between functional connectivity patterns in the trust 
network and behavioral trust-taking change if subjects are exposed to aversive 
emotion? To answer this question, we investigated whether there is a specific 
breakdown of the association between mean transfer rate and TPJ connectivity during 
trust relative to control decisions in the presence of threat via the interaction contrast 
(Trustno threat > Trustthreat) > (NS Controlno threat > NS Controlthreat). We first test for the 
presence of this effect in our a priori ROIs in TPJ and DMPFC. We find a significant 
effect in the right STS [64, -43, 6, p < 0.05, SV FWE-corrected, k = 19; 
Supplementary Table 5b, recall (see online methods) that the STS is the most ventral 
part of our TPJ mask]. We then explored whether other regions also show this 
interaction via a whole brain analysis and find that only the right STS shows an 
interaction effect (64, -43, 6, k = 482; Supplementary Table 6b). To characterize the 
interaction effect, we ran post hoc simple effects analyses that compare the 
relationship between transfer rates and TPJ functional connectivity as a function of 
threat in the trust game. Specifically, we examined whether aversive emotion caused 
significant changes in the relationship between TPJ connectivity (with its target 
regions) and mean trust levels in the trust game. This analysis showed that aversive 
emotion caused a general breakdown of the association between left TPJ connectivity 
and mean trust taking in the right posterior superior temporal sulcus [64, -43, 6, k = 
698, Supplementary Table 6c], as well as two other regions mentioned in 
supplementary table 6. ROI analyses confirm this effect in STS [64, -43, 6, p < 0.05 
SV FWE-corrected, k = 55; Supplementary Table 5c]. In these regions, therefore, 
there is a significantly positive relationship between left TPJ connectivity and mean 
trust levels during the no-threat condition (Figure 3c, green regression line) that 
vanishes in the presence of threat (Figure 3c, red regression line). In contrast, during 
decisions in the non-social control task no voxels in any of our ROIs, as well as the 
superior temporal sulcus showed greater connectivity during no threat relative to 
threat, or the reverse contrast of threat vs. no threat, even at a very liberal threshold of 
p < 0.05, uncorrected.  
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Please note that the region in pSTS that is affected in this way by aversive emotions 
significantly overlaps with the region that shows stronger TPJ connectivity in the trust 
relative to the control task (overlapping region is shown in yellow in Figure 3). These 
results suggest that connectivity between left TPJ and its target region in contralateral 
pSTS supports general trust taking when distortionary aversive emotion is absent. 
However, in the presence of aversive emotion the relationship between the 
connectivity pattern in the trust network and behavioral trust taking reverses. Thus, 
aversive emotion not only reduces average trust taking, but it also diminishes specific 
relationships between the connectivity patterns in the trust network and behavioral 
trust taking. Our results therefore suggest that the pSTS is a crucial neural node that 
mediates the breakdown of trust in the presence of threat. 
 
Aversive emotion alters activation patterns within choice-relevant 
domain-general neural circuitry 
The previous analyses indicate that aversive emotion had distinct effects on neural 
processes devoted to trust decisions and that functional connectivity strength between 
TPJ and its targets was specifically related to behavioral trust. However, the 
pronounced emotional reactions to the threatening context also had an impact on non-
social control decisions. We therefore addressed the question to what extent aversive 
emotion impacts general choice-related neural circuitry in both the trust and the non-
social control game by investigating the main effect of aversive emotion: (Trustthreat + 
NS Controlthreat) > (Trustno threat + NS Controlno threat). We identified a domain-general 
network of regions that show suppression and enhancement in choice-related neural 
activity during both the trust and the non-social control task (Figure 4 and 
Supplementary Table 7). The suppression of neural activity in the threat condition 
(red time course, Figure 4) relative to the no threat condition (green time course, 
Figure 4) is observed in both the trust and non-social control task (Supplementary 
Figure 4) in bilateral posterior dlPFC [left: -62, -4, 18, k = 1901 and right: 62, -6, 28, 
k = 1010], left amygdala [-24, -15, -23, k = 552], posterior paracentral lobule [4 -36, 
69, k = 887], and a large cluster (k = 4082) that includes left vlPFC [-48, 41, -8] and 
vmPFC [-10, 44, -8; Supplementary Table 7a]. Significant enhancement of activity 
during decision-making under aversive emotion (Supplementary Figure 5) was 
obtained in the thalamus [18, -6, 1, k = 559] and cerebellum [-4, -46, -24, k = 849; 
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Supplementary Table 7b]. Together, these results identify a network of domain-
general regions, whose decision-related activity is significantly impacted by 
incidental aversive emotion. Notably, the regions identified by the main effect do not 
overlap with regions showing trust-specific effects (tested via conjunction analysis), 
underlining that the trust-specific effects of aversive emotion occur above and beyond 
domain-general effects on decision-making.  
-------------------------------------[insert Figure 4]---------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Incidental aversive emotion is a ubiquitous phenomenon that pervades many aspects 
of human behavior and human social interaction. In this paper, we investigated the 
behavioral and neural impact of incidental emotion on trust decisions. We employed a 
novel experimental technique to establish aversive emotion by inducing a prolonged 
expectation of unpredictable and aversive tactile stimulation embedded within a 
hybrid fMRI design. The threat of painful tactile stimulation significantly increased 
autonomic arousal during both social and non-social decision-making and was 
associated with consistent self-reports of the experience of aversive emotion. We 
observed that aversive emotion significantly reduced subjects’ trust in their partners. 
To the extent to which aversive emotions are associated with stress, this result is 
consistent with a recent behavioral study that showed that acute stress reduces trust 7. 
Importantly, despite the fact that aversive emotion was incidental to the decisions 
made by subjects, we observed significant behavioral and neural effects of the 
aversive emotional state. The behavioral impact of incidental aversive emotion 
contradicts consequentialist economic models that assume that emotions can at most 
affect choices by changing subjects’ preferences over outcomes9; our results thus also 
underline the importance of emotions in decision-making, even when they are 
unrelated to choice outcomes. 
 
Our neuroimaging results provide information about the neural mechanisms behind 
the reduction of participants’ trust. We show a disruption of trust-specific neural 
activity and connectivity due to aversive emotion. While the dorsomedial PFC 
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(DMPFC) and, most notably, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), were preferentially 
engaged during trust decisions, aversive emotion led to a trust-specific breakdown of 
this activation pattern (Figures 2a-b) in the left TPJ and in right TPJ (at a reduced 
threshold). Moreover, in the absence of aversive emotion, we observed significant 
connectivity between TPJ and amygdala during trust taking, but this connectivity was 
disrupted when we induced aversive emotion (Figures 2c-d). Aversive emotion also 
disrupted the relation between the connectivity patterns in the neural network 
underlying trust and the extent of behavioral trust-taking. In particular, functional 
connectivity strength with the TPJ predicted mean trust levels for a network of 
regions consisting of amygdala, DMPFC, superior temporal sulcus (STS), and 
VLPFC (Supplementary Tables 5 and 6, Figures 3a-b, d). Aversive emotion caused a 
specific breakdown of this association for the posterior STS, such that the 
connectivity between left TPJ and right pSTS no longer predicted overall trust-taking 
(Figure 3c). Our results therefore identify a network of interconnected regions 
consisting of left TPJ, amygdala and right pSTS, for which connectivity patterns 
during trust-taking are significantly impacted by incidental aversive emotion.  
 
The previous literature 3,46,47 has identified betrayal aversion as one of the key 
determinants of trust-taking in the trust game. Betrayal aversion means that subjects 
find it extremely aversive to be cheated in the trust game by an untrustworthy partner. 
Betrayal aversion therefore constitutes a powerful motivation to form expectations 
about the partner’s responses to the various trust levels and to assess the emotional 
significance of these responses. These processes critically involve subjects’ 
mentalizing faculties and the assessment of the (negative) emotional value of the 
possibility of being cheated by an untrustworthy partner 20,27,29,48-50. 
 
The temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the DMPFC have repeatedly been implicated 
in representing and interpreting others’ mental states and behavior 31,32,41,51-53 and the 
amygdala has been shown to respond strongly to variations in the trustworthiness of 
faces 39,40 and other emotionally salient stimuli 54,55. We therefore conjectured that 
these regions also play a key role in the computations involved in assessing and 
evaluation the partner’s anticipated responses in the trust game. This hypothesis is 
consistent with prior reports of TPJ, DMPFC and amydgala activation during trust 
decisions 20,27,29,34,35,48. Our present results significantly extend these prior findings, by  
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underlining the behavioral relevance of interacting neural networks (rather than just 
isolated areas) for trust decisions. This is most consistently shown by our findings that 
enhanced connectivity between TPJ and regions important for social cognition 
(DMPFC, STS) and emotion processing (amygdala, VLPFC) relate to each 
individuals’ levels of trust taking.  
 
Most importantly, however, we show that key components of these trust-supportive 
and trust-specific neural networks are suppressed by aversive emotion. In particular, 
we find that threat of shock leads to (1) specific reductions of TPJ activation during 
trust decisions; (2) specific reductions in the connectivity between TPJ and amygdala 
during trust decisions; (3) general reductions in choice-related activity in the 
amygdala; and (4) trust-specific disruptions of the association between TPJ 
connectivity and mean trust taking. These results thus suggest that aversive emotions 
undermine decisive components of trust-specific neural networks involved in the 
computations relevant for assessing a partner’s responses to various trust levels and 
the associated emotional valuations. This effect is expressed particularly clearly in the 
change in TPJ-amygdala connectivity due to threat-of-shock: In the absence of threat, 
TPJ and amygdala show trust-specific communication likely reflecting the integration 
of social cognitive (mentalizing, TPJ) and social emotional (trustworthiness 
assessments and evaluations, amygdala) information important for trust decisions; in 
the presence of threat, by contrast, the amygdala shows a general suppression due to 
the emotional context (Supplementary Figure 4) and this preoccupation with the 
immediate and emotionally highly salient threatening context seems to prevent it from 
communicating with TPJ. In other words, aversive emotions seem to reduce a 
subject’s capacity to mentalize about and evaluate the emotional consequences of 
various trust levels and, as a consequence, subjects reduce their behavioral trust 
towards their partner.  
 
In conclusion, we report results that show a significant behavioral impact of incidental 
emotions on trust-taking and we identify the trust-specific neural mechanisms 
associated with the impact of aversive emotion on trust taking. These effects were 
observed even though induced emotions were unrelated to the choice outcomes in our 
task, confirming that incidental emotions can have a powerful impact on behavior and 
its underlying mental operations. Our findings inform the development of economic 
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and social theory and call for the integration of incidental emotion in behavioral 
models of social and non-social decision-making 9,56,57. In addition, by identifying the 
specific distortions of the neural network activity supporting trust taking, we provide 
a first step towards neural models that help us better understand such distortions. In 
particular, our results support the notion that an important mechanism through which 
aversive incidental emotion impacts social decision-making is the suppression of 
activity and connectivity between regions known to be crucial for mentalizing about 
other people’s responses (such as the temporoparietal junction, dorsomedial PFC and 
the superior temporal sulcus) and the evaluation of socially threatening stimuli (such 
as the amygdala). Given that psychiatric diseases, such as pathological anxiety, social 
phobia or depression, are characterized by a particularly pronounced susceptibility to 
negative emotion, our results may also be useful in understanding the neural circuitry 
associated with emotion-related distortions of social behavior in psychiatric diseases. 
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Methods 
 
Participants  
41 human volunteers (mean age (std.) = 22 (2.145), 17 females) from various 
Universities in Zurich participated in the current experiment. Only right-handed 
subjects between the ages of 18 – 45 with no prior psychiatric illness, no regular illicit 
drug use and no traumatic head injury were included in the experiment. The sample 
size was based on recommendations for investigations of individual difference in 
fMRI studies based on power simulation 58. All participants gave written informed 
consent to procedures approved by the local ethics committee (Kantonale 
Ethikkommission, Zurich, Switzerland) before participating in the study. Subjects 
were right-handed as assessed by the Edinburgh handedness questionnaire and did not 
report any history of psychological illness or neurological disorders, as assessed by a 
standard screening form.  
 
Prescanning procedure 
Particular care was taken to ensure that subjects understood all aspects of the 
experiment. To this end, subjects were instructed to carefully read detailed 
instructions and were required to fill out an extensive questionnaire probing their 
understanding of the experimental procedures. The accuracy of each subject’s 
answers was confirmed by the experimenters and discussed in a brief interview that 
lasted for ca. 10-minutes. Subjects were then placed inside the scanner for a brief 
practice session consisting of 12 trials to ensure that they could view all stimuli, 
perform the task, make decisions in the allotted 5.5 seconds per trial, understood the 
experimental setup and to give subjects the opportunity to ask further questions.  
After completion of practice, subjects were taken out of the scanner and washed their 
hands before placement of SCR and stimulation electrodes. Subjects were then placed 
inside the scanner and two ring electrodes were attached to the dorsum of the left 
hand: (1) the electrode providing relatively higher intensity stimulation was placed 
between one to two cm below the second carpometacarpal joint, and (2) the electrode 
providing relatively lower intensity stimulation was placed one to two cm below the 
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fifth carpometacarpal joint. To determine individual thresholds for high-intensity and 
low-intensity stimulation, we followed a standard procedure 59,60 and employed a 
visual analog rating scale (VAS) with endpoints defined as 0 = ‘cannot feel anything’ 
and 10 = ‘maximum tolerable pain’. Tactile stimulation was delivered via two 
Digitimer DS5 isolated bipolar constant current stimulators (bipolar constant current, 
5V, 50mA, Digitimer Ltd, Welwyn Garden City, UK) and a custom-made fMRI 
compatible 5-mm ring electrode, which delivered a maximally focused and centered 
tactile stimulus. By varying current amplitude between 1 and 99 % of maximum 
amperage, stimuli with varying intensity levels were repeatedly delivered to each 
participant until stable ratings were achieved at least three times according to the 
following criteria: between 1 and 2 for the low intensity stimulus, and between 8 and 
9 for the high intensity stimulus. Visual and tactile stimulus presentation, as well as 
recording of responses, were controlled by Cogent2000 (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/ 
cogent.php). 
Task 
To investigate the effect of incidental emotion on trust-taking, we employed a hybrid 
fMRI design, in which aversive emotion was manipulated in a blocked fashion while 
social (trust) and non-social (control) tasks were presented in an event-related fashion. 
Specifically, we varied aversive emotion by creating an expectancy of weak or strong 
unpredictable electrical stimulation that could occur at any time for the duration of an 
entire block. This expectancy was created by means of a block cue presented at the 
beginning of each block that informed participants about the game type (trust or 
control game) and the intensity of stimulation (weak or strong) for the current block 
(Figure 1a). Stimulation intensity was communicated to subjects in three ways: (1) via 
a verbal cue embedded in the 750-ms block cue [“strong” for treatment (“threat” 
condition), “weak” for control (“no-threat” condition)]; (2) via a tactile reminder cue 
presented 700 ms after visual cue onset that reflected the exact stimulation intensity of 
the current block; (3) via a specific background color that was consistently associated 
with either threat or no-threat blocks for each subject (color was counterbalanced 
across subjects) and remained constant for the duration of a block. The number and 
time points of electrical stimulation events throughout the blocks were determined to 
be completely unpredictable to subjects, in order to augment the efficacy of the threat-
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of-shock treatment. For this purpose, the number of stimulation events was 
determined for each block by random draw from a gamma distribution (shape 
parameter = 1; scale parameter = 1). The exact timing of these stimulation events was 
then determined at random time points between the offset of the cue display and onset 
of the resting screen drawing from a uniform distribution, with the constraint that at 
least 0.2 s separated successive electrical shocks. Timing and order of stimuli were 
randomized for each subject to maximize identification of the effects of aversive 
emotion on the neural correlates of trust decisions using in-house software 
programmed in Matlab. 
 
Each block commenced with the set of cues described above that indicated the type of 
decision to be made (non-social control or trust) and the level of stimulation (weak, 
strong) to be expected by subjects for the rest of the block. After a brief and jittered 
interstimulus interval of 3-9 seconds, the first of three trials within a given block was 
displayed. In both the trust and the control game, subjects were presented with a 
multiple-choice scenario, in which one of five amounts between 0 and 24 Swiss 
Francs (CHF) could be transferred to Player B or invested in a lottery. While subjects 
always had the options to either invest all (24 CHF) or none (0 CHF) of their 
endowment, each trial presented a novel choice scenario by (1) varying the 
intermediate options between 4, 6, or 8 CHF in the low category, 10, 12, or 14 CHF in 
the medium category, and 16, 18, or 20 in the high category of intermediate transfer 
amounts; (2) varying the location of each choice option and (3) varying the location 
of the originally highlighted choice option. This variability was introduced in order to 
ensure that subjects paid attention to all choice options on every trial and to avoid 
excessive use of heuristics. Intermediate amounts, location of choice options and 
location of the initially highlighted choice option were fully counterbalanced across 
conditions. Subjects selected their preferred option by moving a yellow dot that 
highlighted the currently selected choice option up and down by pressing two 
dedicated buttons on a standard MR-compatible 4-button response box and 
confirming their choice by pressing a third button. At this point the selected choice 
option was highlighted in red for the remaining duration of a trial. After a jittered 
intertrial interval (3-9 seconds) a new trial began. Please note that in order to control for 
wealth effects, subjects in our experiment did not receive trial-by-trial feedback about the 
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financial outcome of their choices in both the trust and the non-social control game. By using 
one-shot games with no feedback we preclude learning- and outcome- related signals 
commonly observed in valuation regions (e.g., 51,61). Subjects completed 28 blocks (7 
blocks per condition with an average length of 38.75 seconds) with three trials each in 
two runs. 
 
Payment determination 
We collected trustee responses in separate behavioral sessions that were conducted 
prior to the fMRI experiment using the same trust game. We elicited the trustees’ 
choices with the strategy method, i.e. the trustees indicated their responses to each 
feasible transfer level. The trustees gave written and informed consent that we could 
use their strategies in follow-up experiments. In the fMRI part of our experiment the 
subjects (investors) thus played against the pre-recorded strategies of the trustees, i.e. 
a subject’s transfer level together with the strategy of the (randomly) matched trustee 
determined the final monetary outcome in a trust game trial. Given the absence of the 
trustee on the scanning day, we informed participants that they were interacting with 
trustees in a temporally delayed fashion. Specifically, we emphasized to subjects that 
their payoffs were determined by decisions of real persons in the trust game, and by a 
computer algorithm in the control game, and that they were assigned different real 
persons across trust game trials. Finally, to maintain the interactive nature of the trust 
game, we informed our subjects that their choices had real, but delayed, consequences 
for trustees, who were sent additional payments according to the decisions made by 
the investor in the scanner after completion of the experiment. During the experiment, 
the subjects did not receive any feedback about the behavior of their matched trustees, 
or the payoff amounts from lottery investments. 
 
After completion of the fMRI part of the experiment, the subjects selected two trials 
at random by dice throw and payment was determined according to the decisions 
made by the subject and the trustee on the selected trials. In order to avoid hedging, 
both payout trials were drawn from the entire experiment, i.e. the payout trials were 
not specific to a condition, such as the trust or control game. If a trust game was 
randomly chosen for payout determination, the investor’s payout was determined 
based on the amount transferred to the trustee and the backtransfer amount of the 
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specific trustee the investor was paired with on that trial (payout investor = 24 – 
transfer to trustee + backtransfer from trustee; payout trustee = 24 + transfer from 
investor * 3 – backtransfer to investor). If a control game was randomly chosen, the 
computer algorithm randomly drew a payout amount from the distribution of trustees’ 
backtransfer amounts. Our procedure therefore created equivalent payout amounts 
and likelihoods for the trust and control game. 
 
Exit questionnaire 
After completion of the experiment, subjects filled out an exit questionnaire that 
probed their beliefs about the accuracy of our instructions, as well as emotional 
reactions to our experimental manipulations. The main goal of the exit questionnaire 
was to measure whether subjects believed our instructions. Note that we implement 
such measurements routinely although we have little reason to believe that subjects 
doubt our instructions. Our laboratory uses deception only as a very rare exception, 
and we also did not use any deception in this experiment and fully disclosed all 
information truthfully to the subjects. Subjects were asked to rate 7 statements on a 
scale from 0, indicating very unbelievable, to 4, indicating very believable. The 
statements declared that the trust games were played with real persons, that each trust 
game was played with an anonymous trustee, that decisions of trustees were made by 
actual persons, and that trustees will receive additional payments based on the 
decisions of subjects on the relevant trial. Subjects’ responses were entered into one-
sample t-tests testing whether responses were significantly greater than the mid-point 
of the scale (2, indicating neither believable nor unbelievable). Mean ratings for all 
statements were significantly greater than two, indicating that subjects believed the 
statements (all t-tests survive the Bonferroni-corrected threshold of 0.007; average 
rating (SD) over all statements is 3.37 (0.86)). 
 
Skin conductance responses (SCRs) 
Skin conductance responses were collected using a PowerLab 4/25T amplifier with a 
GSR Amp (ML116) unit and a pair of MR-compatible finger electrodes (MLT117F), 
which were attached to the participants' left middle and ring finger via dedicated 
Velcro straps after application of conductance gel. Subjects’ hands had been washed 
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using soap without detergents before the experiment. Stable recordings were ensured 
before starting the main experiment by waiting for signal stabilization during training 
and stimulation intensity calibration. LabChart (v. 5.5) software was used for 
recordings, with the recording range set to 40 µS and using initial baseline correction 
(“subject zeroing”) to subtract the participant's absolute level of electrodermal activity 
from all recordings (all specs for devices and electrodes from ADInstruments Inc., 
Sydney, Australia). 
Due to technical problems, data from 4 subjects included 1 run (out of 2) and data 
from 1 subject was lost. Each participant’s SCR data were initially smoothed with a 
running average over 500 samples (equivalent to 500 ms at a sampling rate of 1KHz) 
to reduce scanner-induced noise. Data were then resampled from 1KHz to 1Hz and 
subsequently z-transformed. Statistical analysis of the pre-processed skin conductance 
data followed the approach commonly employed in analyses of fMRI data. 
Specifically, multiple linear regression implemented in AFNI was used to estimate 
SCR during decisions made in each of the task conditions, that is, during trust and 
non-social control tasks and in the context of threat and no-threat treatment blocks. 
The statistical model included a total of 7 regressors that reflected the onset times of 
decision screens in trust and non-social control trials under expectancy of strong and 
weak electrical shocks, cue times indicating the onset of a block, as well as delivery 
times of strong and weak tactile stimulation. To avoid making assumptions about the 
shape of the SCR response, a finite impulse response (FIR) model was used to 
estimate average responses (beta weights) during each trial type via deconvolution 
from event onset to 16s post onset using 17 cubic spline basis functions. Constant, 
linear and quadratic terms were included as regressors of no interest for each run 
separately to model baseline drifts of the SCR. Regressor estimates (beta weights) at 
each time point and for each condition were then used in follow-up analyses reported 
in the Results section. 
 
fMRI data acquisition 
Magnetic resonance images were collected using a 3T Philips Intera whole-body 
magnetic resonance scanner (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) 
equipped with an 8-channel Philips sensitivity-encoded (SENSE) head coil. Structural 
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image acquisition consisted of 180 T1-weighted transversal images (0.75-mm slice 
thickness). For functional imaging, a total of 1095 volumes were obtained using a 
SENSE T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging sequence 62 with an acceleration factor of 
2.0. We acquired 45 axial slices covering the whole brain with a slice thickness of 2.8 
mm (inter-slice gap of 0.8 mm, sequential acquisition, repetition time = 2470 ms, 
echo time = 30 ms, flip angle = 82°, field of view = 192 mm, matrix size = 68 × 68). 
To optimize functional sensitivity in orbitofrontal cortex and medial temporal lobes, 
we used a tilted acquisition in an oblique orientation at 15° relative to the AC-PC line. 
 
fMRI data analysis 
Preprocessing and statistical analyses were performed using SPM8 (Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). To correct for head motion, all 
functional volumes were realigned to the first volume using septic b-spline 
interpolation and subsequently unwarped to remove residual movement-related 
variance due to susceptibility-by-movement interactions. Slice timing correction was 
performed after realignment/unwarping. To improve coregistration, bias-corrected 
anatomical and mean EPI images were created and subsequently coregistered using 
the new segment toolbox in SPM. Images were normalized to the Montreal 
Neurological Institute T1 template using the parameters (forward deformation fields) 
derived from the nonlinear normalization of individual gray matter tissue probability 
maps. Finally, functional data underwent spatial smoothing using an isotropic 6-mm 
FWHM Gaussian kernel. 
Statistical analyses were carried out using the general linear model. Regressors of 
interest were modeled using a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) with 
time and dispersion derivatives in order to account for subject-to-subject and voxel-
to-voxel variation in response peak and dispersion 63. Since our main interest was the 
impact of aversive emotion on trust-taking, we modeled the decision period for the 
full response time on each trial, that is from the onset of the decision screen until 
subjects pressed the confirm button. This was done in the following four conditions: 
(1) trust game during relatively high-intensity stimulation expectancy (threat 
condition), (2) trust game during relatively low-intensity stimulation expectancy (no-
threat condition), (3) control game during relatively high-intensity stimulation 
.CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licensepeer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/129130doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Apr. 24, 2017; 
 28 
expectancy (threat condition) and (4) control game during relatively low-intensity 
stimulation expectancy (no-threat condition). Finally, the following regressors of no 
interest were included in our model: the actually realized weak and strong tactile 
stimulations during a block (one reminder shock and, on average, one additional 
shock randomly drawn from a gamma distribution were administered per block), 
block cues indicating game type (trust, control) and stimulation intensity of the 
reminder shock (weak, strong) at the beginning of each block, as well as omissions of 
behavioral responses during a trial.  
The main goal of the current investigation was to identify the impact of aversive 
emotion on the neural correlates of trust decisions. Trust-specific neural effects of 
aversive emotion can be identified via an interaction between threat and game type, in 
which threat significantly alters the neural correlates of decision-making in trust 
relative to non-social control trials. To investigate the interaction between threat and 
game type, an ANOVA was computed by entering contrast estimates obtained from 
first level models into a flexible factorial model with the factors game type (trust, 
control), threat (absent, present), as well as subject. We were particularly interested in 
trust-specific emotion-induced suppression of activity and connectivity, which we 
tested via the interaction contrast (Trustno threat > Trustthreat) > (NS Controlno threat > NS 
Controlthreat) in the context of the flexible factorial design. A covariate reflective of 
each subject’s mean transfer in each condition was also included to probe for brain-
behavior correlations. All analyses were also conducted without the behavioral 
covariate and results did not change.  
We expected regions commonly implicated in the major cognitive and affective 
component processes of trust taking to be affected by aversive emotion. Specifically, 
we hypothesized that subjects needed to assess the trustworthiness of the trustee to 
make predictions about payout probability in the trust game, which involves regions 
commonly implicated in theory of mind and social cognition 64,65. To identify regions 
implicated in theory of mind, we consulted neurosynth.org 42, which offers a means to 
obtain automated meta-analyses over a large number of prior fMRI investigations and 
thereby provides an independent method to obtain masks for ROI analyses. To guide 
and constrain our ROI selection, we computed the conjunction of the neurosynth 
meta-analyses for the terms “emotion” (forward inference to identify regions that 
.CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licensepeer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/129130doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Apr. 24, 2017; 
 29 
consistently show modified activity) and “theory of mind” (reverse inference to 
identify regions that are specifically involved in theory of mind). This approach 
identified overlap between these networks in left TPJ and DMPFC, which agrees 
particularly well with results from recent a meta-analysis identifying the TPJ and 
DMPFC as core social cognition regions45. Furthermore, because of its prominent role 
in signaling emotional salience 14 , we included the amygdala as an additional ROI 
(see also neurosynth search: “emotion”). 
 
ROI analyses in relevant cortical regions were conducted using small volume 
correction with masks created via relevant search terms on neurosynth.org, while 
anatomically well-defined subcortical ROI masks were created using the AAL atlas 
implemented in WFU Pickatlas. The following independent ROI masks were created 
via automated meta-analyses from neurosynth.org: (1) bilateral temporoparietal 
junction (neurosynth term: theory of mind), with peak voxels in left (-60,-56,14) and 
right TPJ (56,-58,20) and sizes of 1031 and 1416 voxels, respectively. It is 
noteworthy that the ventral part of this mask also contains voxels from posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (STS). For simplicity, we refer to this mask nevertheless as 
“TPJ”. (2) dorsomedial PFC (neurosynth term: theory of mind), with a peak voxel in 
medial DMPFC (-2, 28, 62) and a size of 3175 voxels. The ROI mask for the 
amygdala, which is an anatomically well-defined region, was created via: bilateral 
amygdala (AAL) with sizes of 439 (left) and 492 (right) voxels. Additional 
exploratory analyses were conducted in regions involved in evaluating the anticipated 
outcomes of choice options, such as ventral striatum and vmPFC 66 (neurosynth term: 
“reward”) using the following masks: bilateral ventral striatum (combined mask of 
AAL putamen and caudate up to z = 8), with sizes of 3239 (left) and 3429 (right) 
voxels, respectively; ventromedial PFC (neurosynth search term: ventromedial) with a 
peak voxel in medial vmPFC (8, 24, -12), with a size of 1327 voxels.  
 
Furthermore, to identify whether extended networks outside our regions of interest 
show effects of interest, we conducted whole brain analyses at an FWE-corrected 
extent threshold of p < 0.05 (k > 489, initial cluster-forming height threshold p < 
0.005). Finally, to characterize activation patterns of interest, such as time courses and 
activation differences due to aversive emotion, regression coefficients (beta weights) 
for the canonical HRF regressors were extracted with rfxplot 67 from 6 mm spheres 
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around individual subjects’ peak voxel that showed significant effects of interest on 
BOLD responses and functional connectivity. Follow-up tests that characterize the 
single components of significant interaction effects were conducted in neuroimaging 
space via tests of simple effects of interest.  
 
PPI analyses 
Psychophysiological Interaction analyses were conducted using the generalized form 
of context-dependent psychophysiological interactions toolbox (gPPI toolbox 44), 
using the same statistical model as outlined above. All voxels that survived SV FWE-
correction for the interaction contrast in left TPJ (-60, -54, 19, k=95) were used as 
seed region (shown in blue color in Figure 2c). To obtain an estimate of neural 
activity within the seed region, the BOLD signal from the seed region was extracted, 
corrected by removing effects of noise covariates, and deconvolved 68. Psychological 
interaction regressors for each of the task type and stimulation intensity combinations 
[control decisions during (1) weak and (2) strong stimulation, trust decisions during 
(3) weak and (4) strong stimulation] were created by multiplying the estimated neural 
activity during the relevant decisions with condition-specific on- and offset times 
convolved with the canonical HRF. A new GLM was then estimated for each subject 
that consisted of the original design matrix with the addition of the four psychological 
interaction regressors and the time course from the seed region.  
To investigate the impact of aversive emotion on trust-specific functional connectivity 
of the left TPJ, we probed the functional connectivity data for an interaction between 
threat and game type. To investigate the interaction between threat and game type, we 
entered the contrast estimates obtained from first level PPI models into a flexible 
factorial model with the factors game type (trust, non-social control), threat (absent, 
present), and separate covariates reflecting mean transfer in each condition. A subject 
factor was also included in the model. Given that we were particularly interested in 
trust-specific changes in functional connectivity, we first contrasted the covariates 
reflecting mean transfers in the trust game and mean transfers in the non-social 
control task in the absence of threat (Trustno threat > NS Controlno threat). This 
comparison identifies regions for which connectivity with the TPJ correlates more 
strongly with mean transfers in the trust game than with mean transfers in the non-
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social control game. As the next step, we then examined how threat of shock changed 
the relationship between TPJ connectivity and mean transfers in the trust game, by 
examining the interaction between game type and threat estimated over the covariates. 
We illustrate these results in Figure 3, by regression plots generated with coefficients 
reflecting functional connectivity strength for each of the conditions, extracted from 
6-mm spheres around the peak voxel of the interaction contrast.  The displayed 
regression plots were generated by the following regression model implemented in R 
(using the Regression Modeling Strategies package, RMS): 
yik = β0 + β1 Transferik + β2 GameTypek + β3 Threatk + β4 (Transferik * 
GameTypek) + β5 (Transferik * Threatk) + β6 (GameTypek * Threatk) + β7 (Transferik * 
GameTypek * Threatk)  + εik 
The dependent variable yik is the functional connectivity strength between a given 
brain region and the TPJ for individual i in Game type k. Transferik is the mean 
amount sent by individual i in Game type k. Game type is a dummy variable encoding 
whether decisions were made in the trust or the control task (1 indicates trust, 0 
indicates non-social control task). Threat is a dummy variable encoding whether 
decisions were made in the presence or absence of threat (1 indicates presence, 0 
indicates absence of threat). In this regression, the coefficient for Transferik (β1) 
measures the slope of the relationship between TPJ connectivity and mean transfers in 
the absence of threat in the control task (see blue lines in Figures 3a – 3c), and the 
sum of the coefficients for Transferik (β1) and the interaction term between Transferik 
* GameTypek (β4) measures the trust-related slope increase of the relationship 
between TPJ connectivity and mean transfers in the absence of threat (see orange 
lines in Figures 3a – 3c). Equivalent analyses were performed to probe for significant 
differences between the threat and the no-threat condition in the trust game in the 
relationship between functional TPJ connectivity and mean transfer levels. Here, the 
sum of the coefficients for Transferik (β1), the interaction term between Transferik * 
GameTypek  (β4), the interaction term between Transferik * Threatk (β5), and the 
interaction term between Transferik * GameTypek * Threatk (β7) measures the slope of 
the relationship between TPJ connectivity and mean trust in the presence of threat 
(see red line in Figures 3d). 
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Figure 1. Experimental task, electrophysiological and behavioral findings. (a) Schematic representation of 
hybrid fMRI design, trial sequence and timing (see Methods). Subjects faced blocks of trust (human icon) and 
non-social control (NSC, computer icon) trials in random order. During trust and NSC blocks subjects expected 
either strong (“threat”) or weak (“no-threat”) tactile stimulation at unpredictable times. At the beginning of each 
block, a 750-ms visual cue followed by tactile stimulation reminded subjects of the game type (trust or non-social 
control) and stimulation intensity (weak or strong) for the current block. On each trial, subjects chose how much of 
their endowment of 24 CHF to transfer to a stranger (trust game), or invest in an ambiguous lottery that provided a 
40-60% probability of returning an amount greater than the investment (NSC game). (b-c) The threat of an 
aversive tactile stimulation, not the shock itself (see Methods), leads to a strong increase in skin conductance 
responses (SCR) in (b) the trust game (p < 0.0001) and (c) the non-social control game (p < 0.0001), (d) In the 
threat condition (relative to the no-threat condition) subjects transferred significantly less to an anonymous 
stranger in the trust game (p < 0.005, reduction due to threat in 71% of subjects) and invested less into an 
ambiguous lottery in the non-social control game (p < 0.005, reduction due to threat in 73% of subjects). These 
results are driven by the emotional arousal induced by the threat of a shock and not by the actual experience of 
shocks shortly before choice (Table S1). (e) In the threat condition (relative to the no-threat condition) subjects 
made their decisions significantly faster in both the trust (p < 0.005) and the control (p < 0.05) game. Dot plots 
reflect the difference between mean transfer (d) and response latency (e) in the threat compared to the no threat 
condition for the same subject to illustrate the reduction of mean transfer and response latency due to threat. 
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Figure 2. The impact of aversive emotion on trust-specific TPJ activity and connectivity. Panel (a) depicts 
brain regions (in green) that are selectively involved in trust compared to the non-social control task (see also 
Table S2). These regions comprise the left temporoparietal junction (peak at xyz = -57, -60, 27), the dorsomedial 
PFC (peak at xyz = -9, 60, 18), and the ventromedial PFC (peak at xyz = 9, 32, -12, not shown here). Importantly, 
aversive emotions induced by the threat of a shock reduced activation in left TPJ (relative to “no threat”) 
significantly more during the trust game than in the nonsocial control game (significant interaction effect, peak at 
xyz = -60, -54, 19). Voxels whose activity reflects this interaction effect are shown in yellow. All regions are 
depicted at p<0.05 SVC-FWE-corrected (see methods). Threat-induced reduction of TPJ activity was observed in 
78% of subjects during trust decisions (downward-sloping connecting lines), and in 44% of subjects during non-
social control decisions, as shown in panel (b). The parameter estimates in (b) are extracted from a sphere (6-mm 
radius) around individual peaks within the TPJ cluster marked in yellow in panel a. (c) The left amygdala (peak at 
xyz = -22, -9, -15, see Table S4) shows significantly stronger connectivity with TPJ during trust relative to control 
when aversive emotion is absent. This coupling is disrupted by the threat of a shock specifically during trust as 
compared to the non-social control task (significant interaction effect; peak at xyz = -26, 0, -23). All regions are 
depicted at p<0.05 SVC-FWE-corrected (see methods). Threat-induced reduction of TPJ-amygdala connectivity 
was observed in 76% of subjects during trust decisions (downward-sloping connecting lines), and in 44% of 
subjects during non-social control decisions, as shown in panel (d). The parameter estimates are extracted from a 
6-mm sphere around the individual peaks within the amygdala cluster marked in yellow in panel c, to visualize the 
specific effects of aversive emotion on functional connectivity between the left TPJ and left amygdala during 
decisions in the trust game. Dot plots in panels (e) and (d) reflect individual subject mean activation in each 
condition and are connected to illustrate the suppression of activity due to threat for each subject. 
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Figure 3. Trust-specific functional connectivity (a-b, d) and threat-induced breakdown of connectivity (c) 
between TPJ and a network of target regions. (a-b, d) Results from the simple effects contrast of trust vs NS 
control in the absence of threat are shown in red activation clusters: Connectivity between left TPJ and its targets 
is positively associated with trust taking (orange regression lines) during the no-threat condition in (a) posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (peak at xyz = 63, -45,6), (b) dorsomedial PFC (peak at xyz = -3, 18, 55), (d) bilateral 
ventrolateral PFC (left peak at xyz = -50, 23, -8; right peak at xyz = 57, 20, 10). In contrast, mean transfers (i.e. 
investments) during the non-social (NS) control task (blue regression lines) are associated with reduced 
connectivity strength between TPJ and these regions. In all cases, the correlation between mean transfer and 
connectivity strength is stronger in the trust game compared to the non-social control task (whole brain analysis, p 
< 0.05, FWE corrected at cluster level, see Table S6a). The intraparietal sulcus (peak at xyz = 46, -58, 45) and 
dorsolateral PFC (peak at xyz = 50, 12, 37) show a similar pattern, but are not shown in the figure. (c) The results 
from the interaction contrast reflecting a trust-specific breakdown of the association between mean trust and TPJ 
connectivity is shown in the yellow activation cluster in STS: Aversive emotion causes a breakdown of the 
association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and mean trust (shown in yellow). The correlation between mean trust 
levels and TPJ-pSTS connectivity is stronger in the no threat compared to the threat condition (peak at xyz = 64, -
43, 4; whole brain analysis, p < 0.05, FWE corrected at cluster level, see Table S6b). Specifically, there is a 
positive association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and the mean trust level when distortionary aversive emotion 
is absent (green regression line), which is eliminated by threat (red regression line). This suggests that connectivity 
between TPJ and its target region in pSTS supports general trust taking only in the absence of threat. The 
regression lines in (a-d) predict functional connectivity strength as a function of mean transfer levels based on an 
extended OLS model that estimates both the slope of the relationship between mean transfers and functional 
connectivity in the non-social control task and the increase in this relationship in the trust task (relative to the non-
social control task). For this purpose we extracted the data from 6 mm spheres around individual interaction peak 
voxels (see online methods). Confidence bounds around regression lines reflect 95% confidence intervals around 
the model fit. 
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Figure 4. The impact of aversive emotion on choice-domain independent neural correlates of decision-
making. We tested the main effect of aversive emotion on the neural correlates of decision-making independent of 
the choice domain (social and non-social). This analysis revealed a domain-general network consisting of bilateral 
posterior dlPFC (panel a, right peak at xyz = -62, -4, 18, and (panel c, left peak at xyz = 62, -6, 28), and a large 
cluster in ventral anterior prefrontal cortex that includes vmPFC (panel b, peak at xyz = 10, 44, -8) and left vlPFC 
(panel d, peak at xyz = -48, 41, -8). These regions show significant threat-related suppression (no threat > threat, 
regions shown in green) in choice-related activity during both trust and non-social control trials. Additional 
regions that are shown in Supplemantary Figure 4 include left amygdala (panel c, peak at xyz = -24, -15, -23), 
posterior paracentral lobule (peak at xyz = 4 -36, 69). Time courses reflect choice-domain independent activity that 
shows suppressions due to the aversive emotion during decisions in both trust and non-social control trials. To 
illustrate the equivalent effect of aversive emotion, Supplementary Figures 4 and 5 show activity for both trust and 
control trials in separate graphs. Time courses were extracted from 6 mm spheres around peak voxels. The 5.5-
second choice period is displayed in yellow.  
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